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et al.: FRE and NY Evidence Comparison

RULE 408: COMPROMISE AND OFFERS TO
COMPROMISE
Federal Rule of Evidence 408 states:
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or
(2) accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable
consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a
claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not
admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its
amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise
negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule does not require
the exclusion of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely
because it is presented in the course of compromise negotiations.
This rule also does not require exclusion when the evidence is
offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of
a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an
effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution. I
Under the federal common law, admissions of fact made during
settlement negotiations were only inadmissible if phrased or
preceded with statements such as "'without prejudice.'" or -for

the sake of the discussion only.'"

2

Additionally, admissions made

during settlement negotiations were inadmissible if they were so
intertwined with the offer of settlement that they could not be
separated and could not be understood unless they were read
simultaneously. 3 Rule 408 expands the common law rule b%
1. FED. R. EVID. 408.

2. 2 MCCORIMICK ON EVIDENCE § 266, at 195 (John William Strong ed..
4th ed. 1992). See FED. R. EviD. 408 advisory committee's note.
3. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 266 at 195. See FED. R. EVID. 408
advisory committee's note. The common law rule has been criticized because
[tihe practical value of the common law rule has been greatly
diminished by its inapplicability to admissions of fact.... An inevitable
effect is to inhibit freedom of communication with respect to
compromise, even among lawyers. Another effect is the generation of
controversy over whether a given statement falls within or without the
protected area. These considerations account for the expansion of the
rule herewith to include evidence of conduct or statements made in
compromise negotiations, as well as the offer or completed compromise
itself.
Id.
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excluding evidence of all conduct and statements made during
settlement negotiations in civil suits for the purpose of proving
"liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount," regardless
4
of the existence of any qualifying statements or inseparability.
Completed compromises, offers to compromise, and suggestions
5
of settlement are likewise inadmissible pursuant to this rule.
There are two primary rationales for excluding this type of
evidence. First, evidence of an offer to compromise or
acceptance of an offer is irrelevant, since it could be based on a
desire to achieve a resolution of the dispute as opposed to an
4. FED. R. EvID. 408. In discussing whether or not admissions of fact
made during compromise negotiations remained admissible pursuant to the
common law rule or if they were now inadmissible pursuant to Rule 408, the
House Judiciary Committee stated that "the Rule is drafted ... to
preserve ... possible objections to the introduction of ... evidence [of
unqualified factual assertions]" made during negotiations. H.R. REP. No. 650,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 7081. In
addition, the Senate Judiciary Committee stated that "Rule 408 as submitted by
the Court reverse[s] the traditional rule. It [brings] statements of fact within
the ban and ma[kes] them, as well as an offer of settlement, inadmissible." S.
REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
7051, 7057. This was the version of the rule that was subsequently
implemented. Id. Thus, it seems as though admissions of fact are inadmissible
pursuant to Rule 408, and cannot be used to prove liability, invalidity of a
claim, or invalidity of the amount of a claim. See United States v. Gonzales,
748 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1984). In Gonzales, the court admitted evidence of the
defendant's statements made during settlement negotiations at his criminal trial
in order to prove he had engaged in the criminal activity. Id. at 78. The
Second Circuit, in deciding that Rule 408 did not prevent admission of the
evidence, stated that the policy reasons for Rule 408 are inapplicable in
criminal prosecutions because "[t]he public interest in the disclosure and
prosecution of crime is surely greater than the public interest in the settlement
of civil disputes." Id. Thus, a defendant's admission of guilt made during
settlement negotiations in a civil dispute is admissible at the defendant's
subsequent criminal trial. Id. See also FED. R. EvID. 408 advisory
committee's note. The Advisory Committee has also recognized that since
"[t]he policy considerations which underlie the rule do not come into play
when the effort is to induce a creditor to settle an admittedly due amount for a
the rule requires that the claim be disputed as to either validity
lesser sum ....
or amount." Id.
5. FED. R. EvID. 408 advisory committee's note; MCCORMICK, supra
note 2, § 266 at 195.
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admission of liability. 6 Second and more importantly, public
policy encourages the settling of disputes. 7 If evidence from
settlement negotiations was admissible, parties would be reluctant
to engage in negotiations because they would fear that what took
place during the negotiations could be used against them later. 8

Thus, the rule promotes unrestrained discussions concerning
compromise. 9
In Pierce v. F.R. Tripler & Co., 10 the Second Circuit applied
Rule 408 to exclude evidence of the defendant's job offer to the

plaintiff, even though the defendant sought to introduce the
evidence. 1 1 The court of appeals held that the offer was made

during the course of settlement negotiations.

12

In excluding the

evidence, the court stated that "[v]e believe that admission into

evidence of settlement offers, even by the offeror, could inhibit
6. FED. R. Eviw. 408 advisory committee's note. A compromise offer
should not "imply a specific belief that the adversary's claim is well founded,
but rather [should imply] a belief that the further prosecution of that claim,
whether well founded or not, would in any event cause such annoyance as is
preferably avoided by the payment of the sum offered." 4 WIGMORE ON
EVIDENCE § 1061, at 36 (Chadbourn rev. 1972). However, this evidence has
the potential for being relevant:
[Tihe relevancy of the offer will vary according to circumstances, with
a very small offer of payment to settle a very large claim being much
more readily construed as a desire for peace rather than an admission of
weakness of position. Relevancy would increase, however, as the
amount of the offer approaches the amount claimed.
MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 266 at 194.
7. FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee's note.

8. See MCCORMICK, supra note 2,§ 266 at 194.

9. See Affiliated Mfr.. Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of Am.. 56 F.3d 521, 526
(3d Cir. 1995).
10. 955 F.2d 820 (2d Cir. 1992). In Pierce, the plaintiff, a former
employee of the defendant, brought an action under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act for the defendant's failure to promote the plaintiff. Id. at
823. Prior to the commencement of the suit, the defendant offered the plaintiff
a job in return for an agreement not to proceed with the lawsuit. Id. at 823-24.
The district court decided that the offer was "not 'unambiguously
unconditional'" and therefore not admissible. Id. at 826.
11. Id. at 829.
12. Id.
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settlement discussions and interfere with the effective
administration of justice."' 13 The court recognized that extensive
admissibility of settlement offers could result in a "rash of
motions for disqualification of a party's chosen counsel who
14
would likely become a witness at trial."
Rule 408 is applicable only if the "validity or amount ... of
the claim" is in dispute. 15 As a result, "[a]n offer to pay an
admitted claim is not privileged since there is no policy of
encouraging compromises of undisputed claims. They should be
16
paid in full."
There is a difference of opinion among the federal circuits as to
the meaning of the word "dispute" as it relates to Rule 408. It is
clear that a lawsuit does not have to be filed in order for the rule
to be applicable. 17 However, how close the parties must be to
actual litigation is unclear. The Tenth Circuit has held that
discussions have to "crystallizeo to the point of threatened
litigation" in order to be excluded under Rule 408 as
"compromise negotiations." 18 The Third Circuit, on the other
13. Id. at 827-28.
14. Id. at 828.
15. FED. R. EVID. 408.
16. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 266, at 195. McCormick explains that
"[ijf the validity of the claim or the amount due are undisputed, an offer to pay

a lesser sum in settlement or to pay in installments would accordingly be
admissible." Id. Further, where an offering party later reneges on the accepted
offer, he or she is foreclosed from the Rule's protection since "the privilege
does not extend to the protection of those who repudiate the agreements, which
the privilege is designed to encourage." Id. at 198. See, e.g., Cates v. Morgan

Portable Bldg. Corp., 780 F.2d 683, 691 (7th Cir. 1985) (affirming the district
court's decision to admit a settlement agreement into evidence to prove that the
party breached the agreement).
17. See Affiliated Mfr., Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 56 F.3d 521, 527

(3d Cir. 1995); see also Alpex Computer Corp. v. Nintendo Co., Ltd., 770 F.
Supp. 161, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (asserting that "litigation need not have
actually commenced for Rule 408 to apply").
18. Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d
1365, 1373 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 1052 (1978). The
Tenth Circuit found that the discussions between the parties were "simply

business communications" that were "relevant and material to show
knowledge, willful infringement, and misconduct by [the appellant]." Id. at
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hand, has explicitly declined to adopt the definition of dispute
advanced by the Tenth Circuit.19 In Affiliated Manufacturers,
Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of America,20 the appellant argued that the
district court should not have granted appellee's motion in limine
to exclude certain documents, because those documents "merely
evidenc[ed] discussions that had not yet reached the 'dispute'
stage for Rule 408 purposes." 2 1 In determining that the evidence
was properly excluded, the court held that a dispute exists where
22
there is a "clear difference of opinion between the parties."
The court also stated that "the meaning of 'dispute' as employed
in the rule includes both litigation and less formal stages of a
dispute." 23

Rule 408 further provides that if evidence introduced during
compromise negotiations is otherwise discoverable, then the
introduction of such evidence in the course of negotiations does
not make it subsequently inadmissible at trial. 24 The rationale
behind this exception to the rule is to prevent negotiating parties
from introducing otherwise admissible documentary and physical
evidence during compromise negotiations in an attempt to render
1372. The discussions could have been categorized as compromise negotiations
had they reached a point of "threatened litigation." Id. at 1373.
19. See Affiliated Mfr., Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of Am.. 56 F.3d 521
(1995).

20. Id. In Affiliated Mfr., the district court granted defendant's motion in
limine to exclude certain letters, memoranda, and depositions concerning
settlement negotiations from being admitted at trial. Id. at 523.
21. Id. at 526.
22. Id. at 528. The district court refused to apply the Tenth Circuit's
restrictive interpretation of the word "dispute," which required that the parties
reach a point where litigation is threatened before applying the principles of
Rule 408. Id. at 526-27. See Dallis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.. 768 F.2d 1303.
1307 (lth Cir. 1985) (stating that "[Iflor Rule 408 to apply. there must be an
actual dispute, or at least an apparent difference of opinion between the
parties, as to the validity of a claim"); Alpex Computer Corp. v. Nintendo
Co., Ltd., 770 F. Supp. 161, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating that "lalll that is
needed for Rule 408 to apply is an actual dispute, or at least an apparent
difference of opinion between the parties as to the validity of a claim").
23. Affiliated Mfr., 56 F.3d at 528.
24. FED. R. EvID. 408.
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the evidence inadmissible. 25 However, this exception does not
apply to documentary evidence specifically created for use during
26
settlement negotiations, and such evidence will be inadmissible.
In Ramada Development Co. v. Rauch,27 the Fifth Circuit noted
that the policy reason behind this exception does not extend to
cases where "the document, or statement, would not have existed
but for the negotiations, [because] the negotiations are not being
used as a device to thwart discovery by making existing
28
documents unreachable."
Finally, Rule 408 provides that evidence of compromise or
offers to compromise may be admissible if used for purposes
other than proving "liability for or invalidity of the claim or its
amount."' 29 In addition to "proving bias or prejudice of a
witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an
' 30
effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution[,]
evidence may be offered to explain "prior statements, or failure
to seek employment to mitigate damages or to show the extent of
legal services rendered in conducting them." 31 In such
25. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7057. The Report stated:
This amendment adds a sentence to insure that evidence, such as

documents, is not rendered inadmissible merely because it is presented
in the course of compromise negotiations if the evidence is otherwise
discoverable. A party should not be able to immunize from admissibility

documents otherwise discoverable merely by offering them in a
compromise negotiation.

Id.
26. Ramada Dev. Co. v. Rauch, 644 F.2d 1097, 1107 (5th Cir. 1981).
27. Id.
28. Id. But see Cates v. Morgan Portable Bldg. Corp., 780 F.2d 683, 691

(7th Cir. 1985) (stating that "[o]bviously [the] settlement agreement [itself] is
admissible to prove the parties' undertakings in the agreement, should it be

argued that a party broke the agreement") (citing Central Soya Co., v. Epstein
Fisheries, Inc., 676 F.2d 939, 944 (7th Cir. 1982)).
29. FED R. EVID. 408.
30. Id.
31. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 266 at 196. See Brocklesby v. United

States, 767 F.2d 1288, 1292-93 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating that it was not an
abuse of discretion for the lower court to admit evidence of an indemnity
agreement pursuant to Rule 408 in order to show "the relationship of the

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol12/iss2/14

6

et al.: FRE and NY Evidence Comparison

1996]

FRE AND NYE VIDENCE
COMPARISON

449

circumstances, the probative value of the evidence sought to be
admitted must be balanced against the danger of unfair prejudice
pursuant to Rule 403.32
Thus, under Rule 408, evidence of an offer to settle a disputed
claim or acceptance of such an offer is inadmissible for the
purposes of proving liability, invalidity of the amount of a claim.
or invalidity of the claim itself. 33 On the other hand, the rule
allows the same evidence to be admitted to prove other issues, as
long as its probative value is not substantially outweighed by its
34
prejudicial effect.
The New York rule concerning admissibility of evidence
resulting from offer and compromise was established in White v.
Old Dominion S.S. Co.35 In White, the plaintiff sought damages
for the defendant's negligence in "the performance of a contract
to tow the hull of a steamboat." 36 The issue concerned the
admissibility of a statement made during settlement negotiations
between the plaintiff and the defendant which could have proven
the negligence of the defendant. 37 The court held that -the
admission of a distinct fact which in itself tends to establish a
cause of action or defense is not rendered inadmissible from the
circumstance that it was made during discussion relating to a
compromise, unless it is expressly stated to be made without
parties" and to prove that they "were not adverse." as well as -to attack the
credibility of the witnesses"), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1101 (1986): Olin Corp.

v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 603 F. Supp. 445, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (stating
that "Rule 408 may not exclude evidence that shows the bad faith failure of an
insurance carrier to settle"); Iberian Tankers Co. v. Gates Constr. Corp., 388
F. Supp. 1190, 1192 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding that evidence of settlement

negotiations is admissible if it is used by the court to determine whether or not
to grant prejudgment interest and not to determine liability).
32. MCCORMICK, supra note 143, § 266 at 196-97. See FED R. EvID. 403.

Additionally, an instruction to the jury of the evidence's limited purpose may
be required pursuant to Rule 105. MCCORMICK, supra note 143, § 266 at 197.
33. FED R. EViD. 408.
34. MCCORMICK, supra note 2,§ 266 at 196-97.
35. 102 N.Y. 660. 6 N.E. 289 (1886).

36. Id. at 660, 6 N.E. at 289.
37. Id. at 661-62, 6 N.E. at 290.
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prejudice .... "38 However, if the statement was made in the
course of negotiations, "would not have been made except for the
purpose of producing the objects of the negotiation, and... was
not to be used afterwards to [the party's] prejudice, it is not error
for the court to exclude the evidence." ' 39 As a result of this
holding, the court in White encouraged settlements by
compromise, and therefore, discouraged unnecessary litigation.
Although this case was decided in 1886, the rule of law in New
York remains the same today. In Crow-Crimmins-Wolff &
Munier v. County of Westchester,40 the plaintiff sought
information from the defendant's manager of engineering for
settlement purposes, and both parties agreed that any information
obtained pursuant to that agreement would not be used for
litigation purposes. 4 1 Subsequently, the plaintiff sought discovery
of the information. 42 The issue was whether the information
requested by the plaintiff was privileged under Civil Practice
Law and Rules [hereinafter C.P.L.R.] 3101(b), 4 3 and therefore,
protected from discovery. 44 The Appellate Division, in
determining that the information was not discoverable, stated that
"[a]dmissions of fact explicitly or implicitly made 'without
prejudice' during settlement negotiations are protected from
discovery pursuant to the public policy of encouraging and
facilitating settlement." 45 In addition, the court held that
[a]ctions taken and observations made for the stated purpose of
arriving at a settlement agreement, and expressly not for
litigation, which actions would not have been accomplished
except in a mutual attempt to reach a settlement, should likewise
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 662, 6 N.E. at 291.
Id.
126 A.D.2d 696, 511 N.Y.S.2d 117 (2d Dep't 1987).
Id. at 697, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 118.
Id.
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 3101(b) (McKinney Supp. 1996). This

section provides in pertinent part: "(b) Privileged matter. Upon objection by a
person entitled to assert the privilege, privileged matter shall not be

obtainable." Id.
44. Crow-Crinunins-Wolff& Munier, 126 A.D.2d at 697, 511 N.Y.S.2d at

118.
45. Id. at 697, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 119.
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generally be protected by the same public policy of encouraging
46
attempts at settlement.

The New York rule holds that evidence of an offer to settle or
compromise a claim is not admissible for the purposes of proving
liability. 47 Moreover, the evidence is not permitted to establish a
factual admission. 48 In addition, evidence of settlement offers is
not allowed to establish the amount of an undisputed claim. 49

46. Id.
47. Firedoor Corp. of Am. v. Reliance Elec. Co., 56 A.D.2d 523, 524,
391 N.Y.S.2d 414, 416 (1st Dep't 1977) (stating that "an offer to
compromise... cannot be used as an admission of liability"): Williams v.
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 246 A.D. 891, 892, 285 N.Y.S. 840, 841
(4th Dep't 1936) (stating that "we did not consider the statements made by the
insurer in the course of such negotiationsl] as competent admissions of
liability"); Williamson v. Schwartz, 33 Misc. 2d 557, 558-59. 225 N.Y.S.2d
563. 564-65 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962) (asserting that -the general rule is that
evidence of an offer to compromise or settle a question or claim in dispute is
not competent .... [because] the offer to compromise implies merely a desire
for peace and not a consession of liability") (citations omitted). See EDITH L.
FISCH, FISCH ON NEw YORK EVIDENCE § 796, at 466 (2d ed. 1977) (declaring
that "[ilt is the general rule that unaccepted offers to compromise or settle a
claim either by partial or complete payment, are not admissible to establish
liability").
48. Smith v. Saterlee, 130 N.Y. 677, 679, 29 N.E. 225, 226 (1891)
(holding that an offer of payment contained in a letter was a settlement offer
and did not not constitute "an admission of a fact"), Universal Carloading &
Distrib. Co. v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 101 A.D.2d 61, 63, 474 N.Y.S.2d
502, 503 (1st Dep't 1984) (stating that "[sluch an offer of compromise, made
for the purpose of procuring a settlement of a pending controversey. is not an
admission of fact").
49. Cook v. State of N.Y., 105 Misc. 2d 1040, 1045, 430 N.Y.S.2d 507.
509 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1980) (holding that "[o]ffers made in the course of
settlement negotiations are not competent evidence as to the value of a claim"):
Quillen v. Board of Educ., 203 Misc. 320, 323, 115 N.Y.S.2d 122. 126 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1952) (maintaining that "[clompromise offers are not accepted in
evidence as admissions of liability or to measure the value of an admitted
liability"). See FISCH, supra note 47, § 796 at 466 (asserting that settlement
offers are inadmissible in an attempting to "measure the value of an admitted
liability"); see also In re Brooklyn Bridge Southwest Urban Renewal Project.
50 Misc. 2d 478, 481, 270 N.Y.S.2d 703, 708 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 196b1 (stating
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However, it has been held that this type of evidence may be
admissible for an other purposes, such as "showing an alleged
malicious intent to prosecute the plaintiff." 50
In addition, New York courts have held that documents
prepared for the purpose of settlement negotiations are not the
valid object of discovery. 51 In Randall Electric, Inc. v. State of
New York, 52 documents were prepared during settlement
negotiations and a tentative agreement was reached. 53 After the
tentative agreement was rejected, plaintiff instituted a breach of
contract claim and sought discovery of the documents. 54 The
appellate division, in affirming the decision of the lower court
that the documents were made for the purpose of negotiations and
thus were not discoverable, stated that
the subject documents were created specifically and directly as a
result of the informal, off-the-record negotiations designed to
settle claimant's claim and not in the normal course of the
administration of the contract .... [They] were put together
solely to effect a negotiated settlement of the claim ...[and are

subject to] [tihe immunity afforded materials prepared in
55
connection with settlement of a claim.
that "the general rule [is] that an offer of settlement ...is inadmissible to
show market value").
50. Williamson v. Schwartz, 33 Misc. 2d 557, 558-59, 225 N.Y.S.2d 563,
564-65 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962).

51. Randall Elec., Inc. v. State of N.Y., 150 A.D.2d 875, 876, 540
N.Y.S.2d 901, 902 (3d Dep't 1989).
52. Id.

53. Id. at 875, 540 N.Y.S.2d at 902.
54. Id. at 876, 540 N.Y.S.2d at 902. The court of claims, in refusing to
compel discovery of the documents, determined that "the requested materials
were 'calculations of experts, prepared in evaluating the case for settlement
negotiations' and not merely 'back-up materials to a proposed change order
that was part of the contract work.'" Id.
55. Id. at 876-77, 540 N.Y.S.2d at 902-03. The court distinguished the
agreement from work product and stated that "the fact that the material was
not prepared solely for litigation ...

is irrelevant. The immunity afforded

materials prepared in connection with settlement of a claim is not derived from
[the rule concerning work product]." Id. at 877, 540 N.Y.S.2d at 903
(citations omitted). See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 3101(d)(2) (McKinney
1991).
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Likewise, the fact that actions are taken to tender payment,

make an offer to liquidate damages, or submit a written offer to
compromise pursuant to C.P.L.R. sections 3219,56 322057 and
3221,58 shall not be presented to the jury in a subsequent trial if
the offer is rejected by the offeree. However, "admissions of fact
made in connection with settlement negotiations" are admissible

if made without a qualifying statement. 59 On the other hand, it
56. N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. 3219 (McKinney 1992). Section 3219
provides in pertinent part:
At any time not later than ten days before trial, any party against whom
a cause of action based upon contract. . . is asserted, and against whom
a separate judgment may be taken, may, without court order, deposit
with the clerk of the court for safekeeping, an amount deemed by him to
be sufficient to satisfy the claim asserted against him ....A tender

shall not be made known to the jury.
Id.

57. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 3220 (McKinney 1992). Section 3220
provides in pertinent part:
Offer to liquidate damages conditionally.
At any time not later than ten days before trial, any party against whom
a cause of action based upon contract ...

is asserted may serve upon

the claimant a written offer to allow judgment to be taken against him
for a sum therein specified ....An offer under this rule shall not be

made known to the jury.
Id.

58. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 3221 (McKinney 1992). Section 3221
provides in pertinent part:
[A]t any time not later than ten days before trial, any party against
whom a claim is asserted, and against whom a separate judgment may
be taken, may serve upon the claimant a written offer to allow judgment
to be taken against him for a sum or property or to the effect therein
specified ....An offer of judgment shall not be made known to the

jury.
Id.

59. Central Petroleum Corp. v. Kyriakoudes, 121 A.D.2d 165. 165. 502
N.Y.S.2d 1017, 1018 (1st Dep't 1986). The defendants' admission, contained
in a tentative settlement agreement, -that they were personally served with the
summons and verified complaint and that they [had] no defenses to the
complaint" was an admission of fact, and therefore, admissible. Id. The court
determined that the fact "[tlhat the statement is contained in a settlement
document is immaterial. . .

."

Id. Bellino v. Bellino Constr. Co., 75 A.D.2d

630, 631, 427 N.Y.S.2d 303, 304 (2d Dep't 1980) (stating that -while an offer
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has been asserted that "[h]ypothetical or tentative admissions
made in the course of settlement negotiations are inadmissible in
60
an action arising out of that dispute."
Federal Rule of Evidence 408 and New York common law
have some similarities with regard to the types of evidence that
are considered inadmissible in connection with compromise or
settlement negotiations. Both the federal rule and the New York
rule provide that conduct and actions taken during settlement
negotiations, offers to compromise, and documents created for
the purpose of negotiations are all inadmissible at trial. Federal
Rule of Evidence 408 further provides for the exclusion of all
statements made during settlement negotiations, including
admissions, as well as evidence of completed settlements. The
New York rule also allows the exclusion of admissions made by
a party during settlement negotiations. However, exclusion of
admissions in New York is limited to instances where the party
expressly states that they are "without prejudice," or if they are
tentative or hypothetical. Otherwise, introduction of the
admissions would be allowed at trial.
This type of evidence is inadmissible under the federal rule if it
is being used to prove liability, invalidity of the amount of a
claim or invalidity of the claim itself.6 1 The evidence is
inadmissible under the New York rule if it is being used to prove
liability, a factual admission or the amount of an undisputed
claim. Both Rule 408 and the New York rule state that this type
of evidence may, however, be admissible for other relevant

of settlement would be inadmissible, admissions made in the course of such
negotiations are not").
60. Pennzoil Co. v. Carlson, 178 A.D.2d 1005, 1006, 579 N.Y.S.2d 784,
785 (4th Dep't 1991).

61. FED. R. EVID. 408.
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purposes. 62 Thus, both Federal Rule of Evidence 408 and New
York common law refuse to allow evidence of settlement and
compromise offers to prove liability, but may allow its admission
for other purposes.

62. FED. R. EVID. 408. See supra notes 29-31. 50 and accompanying text.
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